Food insecurity is clearly still a major concern. India maintains an advantageous position over Bangladesh at Farakka, however, it is a lower riparian of China. India has a high dependency on rivers originating in the Chinese-controlled Tibetan Plateau particularly the Brahmaputra and the Ganges. Chinese damming in Tibet has a flow-on effect downstream. Bangladesh is highly dependent on the flow of three major rivers: the Padma, the Jamuna and the Meghna.
Fish from the three major rivers provide almost 80 per cent of the Bangladeshi diet. These waterways are integral to maintaining Bangladeshi food and water security. Floods, water scarcity and poor water quality are the three most severe challenges to water security that Bangladesh faces. Both scarcity and quality — in urban and rural areas — threaten water security. In the s, the country drilled four million wells to replace contaminated surface water. As a result of its poor water quality, Bangladesh experiences frequent outbreaks of water-borne and diarrheal diseases.
Bangladesh has high rates of poverty and population density. In , the number of Bangladeshis living in poverty stood at Like India, Bangladesh has also severely depleted its groundwater. Poor surface water quality has pushed Bangladesh toward a greater reliance on groundwater, but falling water tables are evidence of significant groundwater depletion.
By improving its irrigation practices, Bangladesh has increased its food security by enabling farmers to produce more food at a lower cost for consumers. The irrigation practices continue to be unsustainable, however, and have had a detrimental effect on groundwater levels. Studies have been conducted on water supply before and after the construction of Farakka.
Until , when the Farakka Barrage was created, water supply into Bangladesh was adequate. After the creation of the barrage, Bangladesh started to experience reduced water flow. Any change in the flow of the Ganges through Farakka has the ability to significantly alter Bangladeshi agriculture, fisheries and livelihoods.
Given its geographical position, India has a strategic advantage over Bangladesh. Bangladesh is extremely vulnerable to upstream decisions, particularly Chinese and Indian dam construction and operation. India relies on its military and economic strength to act unilaterally in water-sharing scenarios, especially with the creation of the Farakka Barrage.
While the barrage reduces salinity in Kolkata, the diversion of the Ganges has increased river salinity in Bangladesh.
As rice paddies are sensitive to salinity increases, this poses a threat to Bangladeshi food security. Decreased river flow effects the Bangladeshi environment, particularly the Sundarbans mangrove forest.
Forest degeneration has caused Bangladesh to reduce its timber production and has created an economic loss for the country. Unfit drinking water increases the susceptibility of Bangladeshis to venereal diseases. Given that increasing salinity has a detrimental effect on the Bangladeshi environment, economy and public health, this has the potential to increase tensions between the riparian neighbours. It could be seen to grant India a means to influence the business and economic decisions of Bangladesh, particularly if India is able to control how much water flows into Bangladesh.
There have been few incidents of traditional wars over water to-date. It is, however, increasingly likely that such events may take place in the long-term if there is not greater international co-operation over transboundary rivers.
Given the importance of food and water security, and the adverse effects that Bangladesh has experienced as a result of the Farakka Barrage, it is possible although unlikely that relations between India and Bangladesh may weaken in the short-term.
As the two become more water-scarce, and population pressures further impact water availability, conflict may accentuate in the absence of a concrete water-sharing arrangement. Feeder Canal of 40, cusec cumec carrying capacity and Navigation works such as locks, lock channels, shelter basins, control towers, navigation lights and other infrastructure. Two road-cum-rail bridges and two road bridges across the Feeder Canal. Bagmari Syphon at RD Anti-erosion protection work in the original jurisdiction of Farakka Barrage Project i.
Maintenance of Afflux Bunds. This paper analyzes the political developments in Bangladesh and India over Farakka issue from historical perspectives. It also reveals the adverse effects of Farakka Barrage on environment in Bangladesh. The aim is to provide policy makers with the insights into historical developments of disputes centred on Farakka Barrage to contribute towards better water governance.
Over the past few decades, many of the 54 rivers in Bangladesh that originated in India have been either diverted or dammed upstream, inside India. All of these hydro-developmental initiatives have left a profound impact on the ecology of Bangladesh which is reported to have been significantly affected by the disruption of natural water flow in its rivers. Since its birth, Bangladesh has been in an ever growing disputation over the water sharing issues with India.
After commissioning Farakka barrage in , India has been diverting most of the water flow of the river Ganges to her end. As a result Bangladesh is losing a lot of its agricultural and industrial production, fishing and navigation, human health and wellbeing and so on. Changing water flow of the river Ganges has eventually changed the hydraulic character of the rivers and the ecology of Bangladesh.
The environmental changes have resulted in the loss of livelihood of a large population in the south-western part of Bangladesh in particular and across the country in general Swain : Even though politically all seven countries of South Asia have their independent territories, much of the natural resources are shared by two or more political boundaries.
Such situation is extremely delicate for flow resources like rivers where demarcation is difficult. The issue becomes important when it comes between in cases like Bangladesh and India since they have been sharing 54 common rivers. Water sharing of the Ganges, the Brahmaputra, and the Meghna could not come to a stable point between Bangladesh and India, despite having a long history of negotiation.
A gradual shift has been observed over the years in the definition of environmental issues from an early focus on incorporating environmental and related concerns to a new focus on searching the cause of conflict due to environmental change. Based on documentary evidences it seeks answers to the question of how did the politics in Bangladesh and India develop centering the Farakka issue?
How did the construction and commission of Farakka Barrage leave profound effects on the environment in Bangladesh? The emergence of ecological controversies between India and Bangladesh can be traced back to the politics during the British colonial period. The idea of diverting water from the east-bound Ganges for West Bengal first surfaced in the early nineteenth century, but in the late colonial period the idea of tampering with the hydrological regime for development projects formed a major part of the modernizing programme of the nation.
In this context, Saha imagined a national purpose behind all planning Arnold A new form of environmental political economy emerged after the second partition of Bengal in This anxiety resurfaced around the issue of the two nation theory in the attempt to strike a political boundary that would leave Muslim majority Murshidabad in India and Hindu majority Khulna in East Pakistan, in order to secure a hydrologically suitable spot for diverting Ganges water Chatterji Murshidabad is important to India as the take off point of Bhagirathi—Hooghly and a considerable stretch of it falls in Murshidabad to coordinate the flow of the Ganges with Bhagirathi.
This very partition indicates that the politics played important role in ecology and shaping the border of two post colonial states—India and Pakistan. The genesis of disputes over Ganges water lies there which was aggravated eventually in the course of time. The then Maharaja of Cossimbazar, Srischandra Nandy noted that. Our position as regards food production has been dangerously affected due to the major paddy-growing areas being made over to Eastern Bengal.
In short, as a result of partition there is now the sad legacy of less food but more to be fed Nandy For Nandy, the slogan was to produce or to perish, a dilemma that was to be addressed by an improved river system.
To him, the scheme of a barrage across the Ganges was perhaps the only effective means of inducing a plentiful supply of fresh up-land water down through the Bhagirathi, the Hooghly and other dead and dying spill-channels in central Bengal. The foremost objective behind construction of the Farakka Barrage was reiterated in the government documents in India was only and exclusively the preservation and maintenance of the Calcutta port and the water regime and navigability of Bhagirathi-Hooghly River Government of India A number of minerals, metals, beverages, wood-based, food processing, leather, jute and chemical industries are dependent on this part.
However, over the years the pre-eminent position of Calcutta port has declined due to progressive deterioration of head water supply of Bhagirathi-Hooghly. The decreased water flow created problem of siltation which has resulted in frequent occurrence of tidal bores. Footnote 2 This led to overall reduction in navigability. Besides, the decline of traffic in the Calcutta port took place despite rapid industrialization of Eastern hinterland since independence in Government of India India opined that all the studies conducted in regard to safety of Calcutta port beginning from mid-nineteenth century came to the identical conclusion that the safety of Calcutta port is dependent upon increase in the headwater supply through diversion of water by means of a barrage Government of India Preliminary planning for Farakka Barrage in India had commenced way back in —51, when Bangladesh was still a part of Pakistan.
At that juncture Pakistan had expressed concerns on the possible effects of the Farakka Barrage on East Pakistan. At the same time India carried on her project planning. Pakistan requested India to consult her prior to operation of any scheme which would have adverse effect on East Pakistan.
In , India proposed that the two countries should collaborate in the development of Ganges water resources. In the following year, Pakistan threw an outline of Ganga-Kobadak GK project in East Pakistan including a proposal for irrigating two million acres of land requiring a maximum of cusecs of water and joint survey of upper reaches of Ganges and Brahmaputra but India refused this outline.
The two governments, however, agreed to exchange available data in respect of projects of mutual interest and to conduct meeting of experts on both sides.
Accordingly, there were five meetings of experts in —62 and again in —69 as there was an interlude due to India Pakistan war Pakistan proposed that they should avail of technical and advisory services of the United Nations but India turned it down. At the secretary level talks in , Pakistan raised her voice for a package deal guaranteeing fixed amount of water to East Pakistan and prescribed a mechanism for the implementation and supervision of the agreement Hossain : India, however, refused to arrive at any decision until exchange of data and agreement on basic technical facts.
The last meeting between India and Pakistan at secretary level was held in 16—17 July in New Delhi. It was agreed that the point of delivery of water into East Pakistan would be at Farakka and that a body consisting of one representative of each country would be constituted to ensure delivery of water, the amount of which was to be decided on later.
The decision reached at this meeting could not be implemented as domestic turmoil engulfed Pakistan resulting in the birth of Bangladesh. Thus, in spite of exchange of data and meetings between India and Pakistan, no agreement was reached regarding water sharing of the river Ganges. Pakistan was preoccupied with the Kashmir question and was not serious enough to push through an agreement on sharing of Ganges waters similar to Indus Basin Treaty between India and Pakistan.
With a 75 feet high and feet long barrage, a Thus, India was successful in persuading British colonial rulers regarding the border between India and Pakistan considering the ecologically strategic points. This initial success of India gave her an upper hand in negotiating with Pakistan during post colonial era. The political developments of this period reveals that the emergence of nation states in South Asia during post-colonial period drew lines of demarcation on the common rivers according to the borders of those nation states.
It developed a sense of individual ownership instead of collective ownership over the common rivers which can be identified as one of the major reasons behind using these rivers at the cost of the interests of co-riparian states. Internal turmoil in Pakistan reduced its negotiating capability regarding water sharing issues with India. Moreover, India—Pakistan War in hampered the process of negotiations.
A breakthrough was made in the initial years but it was short-lived and the relations grew more strenuous in the years to come. The formation of a government in Bangladesh by the Awami League brought about new hopes for a settlement of the Farakka issue. In place of Pakistan, India now faced a friendly but weak Bangladesh across the negotiating table. This Commission conducted joint aerial hydrographical surveys, joint survey of embankments on common rivers on both sides boundary to identify weak points which could be strengthened and gaps which could be closed by further embankments.
Bangladesh had reconciled herself to the existence of the Farakka Barrage. Of importance now was the sharing of the Ganges waters.
A temporary arrangement for allocation of Ganges waters was made following an agreement signed on 18 April Gulati Table 1. This agreement was hailed as an outstanding example of mutual understanding and accommodation.
It was signed on a trial basis. India withdrew water in the lean season of in terms of the agreements and remaining flew to Bangladesh. Indian share was significantly lower than her requirement that proves her political will at this stage. The friendly Mujib government was perhaps the best option for India to secure her interest in Bangladesh. Eventually, the ecologically important water issues for both Bangladesh and India got a political flavour with the hand of Indian government immediately after the fall of Sheikh Mujib.
This arrangement expired on 31 May , and until it was replaced by another agreement in , India unilaterally withdrew water 40, cusecs at Farakka that led to a controversy. Bangladesh desired an equitable sharing of water and regarded the Indian action as breach of agreement. Throughout —77, India withdrew water on her own decision. In response to complaint of Bangladesh, India complained that in spite of specific provision in agreement, government of Bangladesh did not fully cooperate in compiling data and information needed to finalize the joint assessment of the effects of withdrawal at Farakka Government of India Bangladesh assailed India for diversion of water which caused her severe hardships.
Both at the national and international level, Bangladesh displayed widespread resentment against withdrawal of water by India. Bangladeshi leader, Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhasani sought to mobilise public opinion on alleged devastating desertification caused by reduced flow of Ganges that was created by India.
Nationalist leader Bhasani threatened to lead a long march to demolish Farakka on which depended survival of about three and a half crores of people of northern and south-western Bangladesh. He even exchanged letters with the then Prime Minister of India, Indira Gandhi and appealed to her to. Personally intervene and work out a solution yourself, which could be acceptable to Bangladesh.
If this was not done, I shall be compelled to follow the path of struggle I have learnt from your forefathers and Mahatma Gandhi Asian Recorder India argued that Farakka barrage was the only means of saving Calcutta port and hence could not be abandoned; but in a spirit of mutual understanding and cooperation shortfalls in the water flow could be made up.
Indira Gandhi stressed that India had maintained the flow into Bangladesh by denying even minimum quantity of water required to flush Hooghly. Maulana Bhasani launched the Farakka Long March on May 16, to draw the attention of people of India towards demands of people of Bangladesh on sharing of waters. However, both the governments were vigilant to prevent any possible danger to the barrage.
It was evident that the government of Bangladesh was concerned with maintaining good relations with India and at the same time was trying to mobilise a public support to make India understand the potential ecological and economic danger of Farakka barrage in Bangladesh.
Although a popular resentment was concentrated among the common people of Bangladesh, the post Mujib government followed the way of peaceful solution of the Farakka issue with India. Since India had turned hostile and was also trying to destabilise the Zia regime, Bangladesh required world support.
Bangladesh raised the issue in international forums to gather world sympathy and possibly to earn legitimacy for the military government. With the change of government in India with Desai at the helm, the relation between Bangladesh and India considerably improved. India agreed that support extended by previous government to guerrillas to destabilize Zia regime would be snapped.
India refrained from aiding the pro-Mujib guerrillas in India, to see that no shelter was given to criminal elements from across the border The Hindu Despite the elimination of hostility, not much progress was seen regarding the Farakka issue. The Indian side, however, took the view that the problem was a bilateral one and any attempt to internationalise it would only complicate the situation, delay solution and worsen their relations.
India urged the General Assembly that she wished to develop friendly relations with Bangladesh on the basis of equality to mutual benefit but the discussion of this question at United Nations would only lead to complications.
Despite bickering in the world body, the issue remained unresolved as only a census statement emerged after a discussion. This section suggests that good relationship between Bangladesh and India during Mujib-Indira governments played positive role in resolving the disputes over water sharing of the river Ganges.
But changes in the government in Bangladesh impacted upon the water governance of the river Ganges as the governments lacked mutual understanding on Farakka issue. Observing no progress at government levels, a popular movement was mobilized in Bangladesh by Bhasani which led to a long march upholding the demand of equitable share of water of the River Ganges.
This section also indicates that the efforts towards internationalization of the issue by Bangladesh could not earn much in terms of getting any solution from the international community.
It, however, could bring India into the negotiations. As a result water sharing agreements of and memorandum of understandings MoU between India and Bangladesh were signed. After protracted negotiations India and Bangladesh formally entered into an agreement on 5 November devising a formula for sharing dry season flow of water. The then President of Bangladesh Ziaur Rahman played the vital role in materialising the agreement.
This agreement was completely bilateral in nature and it laid down that any differences in its interpretation would also be solved bilaterally. It was a landmark in the relations of the two neighbouring countries. India was also striving to give new directions to foreign policy in terms of promoting friendly relations with all, especially with neighbours. The agreement signed for 5 years offered only partial solution as it only decided the sharing of lean period flow.
The short term aspect of the agreement fixed the quantum of water from the flow of Ganges at Farakka for the two sides during 5 months period from January to May every year.
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